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Abstract 
 
Smugglers and State-Builders: Opiate Trafficking and Institutional 
Development in Interwar Egypt and Turkey 
 
Mitchell Alan Bacci, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
 
Supervisor:  Tarek El-Ariss 
 
During the late 1920s and early 1930s, Turkey and Egypt constituted the world’s 
largest producer and consumer of opiates respectively. Throughout this period, tons of 
heroin and morphine flowed across the Eastern Mediterranean, triggering an 
unprecedented epidemic that swept through Egypt and claimed nearly four percent of the 
country’s population as addicts. However, the immense impact of the interwar opiate 
trade and epidemic on the societies, economies, and institutions of interwar Turkey and 
Egypt remains largely absent from Middle Eastern historiography.  
Drawing on Egyptian and Turkish state records, memoirs, and periodicals, this 
research incorporates the complex networks of opiate traffickers, distributors, consumers, 
law enforcement agents, bureaucrats, and diplomats into the narrative of regional history. 
It contends that Egyptians, by participating in the opiate trade, formed profitable 
 vi 
networks that helped relieve local economic pressures resulting from the Great 
Depression, which devastated the national cotton economy and, with it, the Egyptian 
middle class. While the interwar opiate trade generated considerable illicit economic 
activity, government responses to the epidemic created opportunities for local bureaucrats 
and politicians to overcome the stringent fiscal austerity of the semi-colonial Egyptian 
state, build enforcement institutions like the Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, and 
provide public health services such as drug treatment. Simultaneously, Egyptian 
journalists and diplomats responded to the epidemic by contributing to a growing tide of 
international diplomatic, economic, and popular pressure that prevailed upon Turkey to 
introduce narcotics regulation in the early 1930s. Turkey’s subsequent move to regulate 
the opiate industry by creating the Narcotic Substances Monopoly transformed this illicit 
trade into a major source of government revenue that fueled an emerging program of 
statist development.  
Tracing the trajectory of opiates from Turkey to Egypt demonstrates 
unconventional role of narcotics in both countries’ processes of state-building and 
complicates the traditional conception of commodities as simply a source of funds for 
development. On the contrary, this framework presents the sale and suppression of 
substances as engines of state development and democratizes study of state formation by 
exposing the diverse cast of historical actors who fueled both the commerce and 
regulation of opiates in interwar Turkey and Egypt. 
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Introduction 
 
On April 16, 1938, destitute and pregnant with three children and a bedridden spouse to 
support, Maria Vescia donned the habit, veil, and crucifix of a Franciscan nun and boarded the 
S.S. “Marco Polo” along with three other piously dressed accomplices. Aboard the ship, which 
arrived at the Egyptian port of Alexandria that morning, the group proceeded to the baggage 
claim where they received a large suitcase and the key to a first-class cabin. Once inside the 
cabin, Maria and her accomplices quickly removed over twelve kilograms of opiates from the 
bag and strapped the drugs to their bodies using meters of surgical gauze bandages before exiting 
the ship with the contraband neatly concealed under their religious vestments. However, as they 
stepped off ship’s gangway and into the port, Egyptian Customs officials descended on the 
traffickers and detained all four members of the group, as well as an actual nun who, 
coincidentally, disembarked from the vessel moments later.1  
The exploits of the “pseudo priests and nuns,” as the Egyptian press dubbed the 
traffickers, provide an intimate glimpse into the profitable and pervasive, yet scarcely studied, 
opiate trade that spanned the Eastern Mediterranean during the interwar period.2 Turkey and 
Egypt constituted the two primary participants in this trade. During the late 1920s and early 
1930s, these countries emerged from devastating conflict, economic crisis, and foreign 
occupation as the world’s largest producer and consumer of opiates respectively. Throughout this 
period, the nascent Turkish Republic grew into the global epicenter of the illicit opiate trade and 
manufactures in Istanbul alone refined approximately twelve tons of heroin and morphine 
                                                 
1 Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report for the Year 1938 (Cairo: The Bureau, Cairo : The Bureau), 
28-33.  
2 Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report for the Year 1938, 28-33.  
  2 
annually.3 As these drugs diffused across the Eastern Mediterranean and into the semi-colonial 
state of Egypt, they precipitated an opiate epidemic that state authorities estimated to have 
reached nearly four percent of the county’s population.4 The opiate trade and ensuring epidemic, 
in short, had an immense impact on the societies, economies, and institutions of interwar Turkey 
and Egypt. 
 
Figure 7: The “pseudo priests and nuns” pictured in their disguises. Maria Vescia (L).5 
 
 
  
                                                 
3 Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report for the Year 1930, IX and 20. 
4 For Egyptian addiction figures see Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report for the Year 1929, 31. 
5 Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report for the Year 1938, 28-33 
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From cultivation to consumption, the interwar opiate trade spanned social strata and 
permeated the borders of newly established nation states throughout the region. For Egyptians, 
the trade constituted a source of social problems as well as economic and political opportunities. 
By promoting the opiate trade, Egyptian traffickers and dealers mitigated the negative economic 
impacts of the Great Depression in their country. Similarly, the efforts of Egyptian politicians 
and bureaucrats to police the ensuing epidemic strengthened their position in negotiations with 
the colonial administrators in the Egyptian state, which allowed them to develop enforcement 
agencies and build public health institutions. However, the opiate trade also had profound 
transnational ramifications. In response to these epidemic, Egyptian politicians, bureaucrats, and 
journalists contributed to a growing tide of international diplomatic, economic, and popular 
pressure that eventually prevailed upon Turkey to introduce a narcotics control regime in the 
early 1930s. Turkey’s subsequent move to regulate and monopolize its lucrative domestic opiate 
industry had transformative effects on the trade and fueled an emerging program of statist 
economic policy that, as the opiate epidemic in Egypt, helped Turkey respond to the to the 
adverse economic impacts of the Great Depression.  
Tracing the transnational trajectory of opiates from Turkey to Egypt illustrates the 
important, yet unconventional, role that narcotics played in both countries’ processes of state 
development during the interwar period. In Egypt, control and mitigation of the opiate trade and 
the attendant epidemic justified investments in public security and health that allowed local 
officials to pursue programs of institutional development and ‘Egyptianization’ despite great 
economic and political constraints. Likewise, Turkey’s move to regulate narcotics manufacturing 
allowed the government to monopolize its domestic opiate trade and provided the country with a 
steady stream of revenue during a period of statist economic expansion. The nuanced 
  4 
relationship between narcotics and nation-building in both countries complicates the traditionally 
straightforward conception of commodities, like narcotics, as simply a source of funds for 
development. Instead, this model presents both the commerce and regulation of narcotics as 
engines of state development. As a diverse cast of historical actors fueled these engines, the 
following research democratizes the study of nation-building in interwar Egypt and Turkey, 
indicating drug traffickers as well as politicians in a bottom-up process of state development.  
The Interwar Opiate Trade and Middle Eastern Historiography 
Despite the significant role that the interwar opiate trade and epidemic played in the 
complex process of Egyptian and Turkish state development, both remain largely absent from 
modern Middle Eastern historiography due to two factors. First, histories of narcotics trafficking 
and drug diplomacy tend to focus on Europeans and Americans (for whom exists a rich 
evidentiary base) to the detriment of regional actors. Second, the analytical ascendance of the 
nation-state paradigm generally discourages scholars from examining the transnational 
connections between different states and arbitrarily restricts or altogether fails to capture the 
narratives of individuals who do fit cleanly in this single polity framework. Understanding and 
incorporating the narratives of Egyptians and Turks into a transnational history of the interwar 
opiate trade and epidemic not only brings together previously compartmentalized areas and 
demographics, but also historiographies.  
Egyptians and Turks in the Interwar Opiate Trade 
While a few global histories of drugs and narcotics address the impact of the interwar 
opiate trade and epidemic in Turkey and Egypt, they largely attribute narcotics trafficking and 
control to external forces. In the case of Egypt, rather than focusing on Egyptian opiate 
  5 
traffickers, dealers, and consumers, these histories construct a narrative of shadowy foreign 
(usually European) smugglers who manipulated centuries old Ottoman capitulatory agreements 
to circumvent the Egyptian legal system and engage in the illicit narcotics trade.6 Likewise, their 
accounts of government responses to the epidemic largely ignore the actions of Egyptian police, 
bureaucrats, and politicians in favor of the British civil servants who worked on behalf of the 
semi-colonial Egyptian state.7 Although foreign actors and legal structures undoubtedly shaped 
Egypt’s interwar opiate trade, emphasizing the foreignness of these substances neglects the 
influence that Egyptians themselves exerted over the country’s illicit opiate economy. During 
this period, Egyptian smugglers, merchants, dealers, and consumers played the dominant role in 
disseminating opiates throughout the country, which left local government officials, police 
officers, and the emerging professional class (al-effendiyyah) scrambling to address the ensuing 
epidemic.8  
Focusing on Egyptians demonstrates that, even though the interwar opiate economy 
fueled myriad social problems in Egypt, it also created economic and political opportunities. 
Egyptians, by participating in the opiate trade, formed profitable networks that helped them 
relieve local economic pressures resulting from the Great Depression, which devastated the 
national cotton economy and, with it, the Egyptian middle class. While the interwar opiate trade 
generated considerable illicit economic activity, the government response to the subsequent 
                                                 
6 The capitulations granted extra-territorial rights to some foreign communities. See Maurits H. van den Boogert, 
The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls, and Beraths in the 18th Century, Studies in 
Islamic Law and Society, v. 21 (Leiden [The Netherlands]; Boston: Brill, 2005). 
7 R. P. T. Davenport-Hines’ account of the epidemic, for example, details Russell Pasha’s efforts to catch and 
prosecute predominantly European traffickers. R. P. T. Davenport-Hines, The Pursuit of Oblivion: A History of 
Narcotics (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001).  
8 This keen attention to the roles that Egyptians played in the interwar opiate epidemic reflects recent trends in the 
social history of drugs and narcotics emphasizing the ways in which local consumers, dealers, and officials shaped 
markets for narcotic substances. See Liat Kozma, “White Drugs in Interwar Egypt: Decadent Pleasures, Emaciated 
Fellahin, and the Campaign against Drugs,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 33, no. 1 
(2013). James H. Mills and Patricia Barton, eds., Drugs and Empires: Essays in Modern Imperialism and 
Intoxication, c.1500-c.1930 (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
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epidemic enabled Egyptian bureaucrats and politicians to overcome the stringent fiscal austerity 
of the semi-colonial Egyptian state, build enforcement institutions like the Central Narcotics 
Intelligence Bureau (CNIB), and provide public health services for treating drug addiction. 
Although inherently at odds, these local criminal networks and newly established government 
institutions grew symbiotically and together influenced the trajectory of Egyptian state 
development in the early twentieth century. 
 As with the historiography of the Egyptian trade and epidemic, only a small number of 
histories address the implications of the lucrative opiate industry for early Republican Turkey. 
This literature, which generally approaches the opiate trade from the vantage of international 
drug diplomacy, tends to focus on the interplay between select high-level European and 
American policymakers who attended drug control conferences and negotiated narcotics 
regulation treaties during the early–mid twentieth century.9 In so, these works provide valuable 
insight into the connections between shifts in Turkish drug regulation policies and broader trends 
in global narcotics control. However, their wide geographic scope overlooks the important 
regional actors and events that shaped Turkey’s opiate industry during the interwar era. 
Although the United States, Canada, and Western European countries featured 
prominently in multilateral narcotics control negotiations with Turkey during the interwar period, 
they alone did not create the country’s drug policy. As the largest regional consumer of narcotics 
and the site of an unprecedented opiate epidemic, Egypt played a significant role in the sustained 
diplomatic, economic, and popular media campaign that resulted in the creation of Turkey’s 
                                                 
9 For example, William B. McAllister’s Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History uses 
Turkey’s opiate industry as a backdrop for, what he considers, the failures of multilateral narcotics control 
negotiations in during the 1900s.William B. McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International 
History (London ; New York: Routledge, 2000). Ryan Gingeras’ Heroin, Organized Crime, and the Making of 
Modern Turkey, which employs the opiate trade as vehicle to study the history of connections between local as well 
as international crime syndicates and the Turkish government, marks a notable exception to this trend. Ryan 
Gingeras, Heroin, Organized Crime, and the Making of Modern Turkey (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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narcotics regulation regime of the early 1930s. Similarly, even though traffickers, dealers, and 
addicts largely fueled the interwar opiate trade, other demographics also engaged in this lucrative 
industry. Narcotics regulation in Turkey consolidated the country’s illicit opiate industry under 
the Turkish Republic Narcotic Substances Monopoly (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Uyuşturucu 
Maddeler İnhisarı or U.M.İ.), which allowed Turkish bureaucrats and politicians to appropriate 
the drug trade and use its vast profits to pursue institutional development along the lines of the 
country’s emerging program of etatism.  
The Nation-State Paradigm and the Interwar Opiate Trade 
While the tendency among historians to emphasize the roles of Europeans has 
marginalized the impact of Turks and Egyptians on the interwar opiate trade and epidemic, 
reliance on the nation-state as an analytical framework has obscured the important transnational 
connections between these countries. Modern Middle Eastern historiography largely 
compartmentalizes the study of the interwar Eastern Mediterranean into nascent nation states and 
European mandates. In the aftermath of World War I, many scholars argue, new political entities 
erected borders that destroyed or fundamentally reconfigured regional economic and social 
relations.10  
Modern Middle Eastern historians attribute the interwar compartmentalization paradigm 
to various sources. Şükrü Hanioğlu, for example, traces this trend to the teleologically driven 
narratives of twentieth century nationalist historians who viewed ethnic and national divisions as 
innate and, therefore, envisioned history as an inevitable march toward the rise of nation states.11 
Hanioğlu’s A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, which singles out nationalist teleology 
                                                 
10 This paradigm appears throughout the otherwise conceptually rigorous work of the late Ottoman economic and 
labor historian Donald Quataert. Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922, New Approaches to European 
History (Cambridge, UK: Cambrige University Press, 2005), 127. 
11 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 1-2. 
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as “a major obstacle” to contemporary regional historical scholarship, notes that it “distorts key 
historical processes by pulling them out of their historical context and placing them in a 
contrived chain of events leading up to the familiar post-imperial world.”12 Additionally, Hasan 
Kayalı argues that partitioning the field of modern Middle Eastern history among Arabists and 
Ottomanists (to name a few branches) has created an academic division of labor that has further 
exacerbates the interwar compartmentalization paradigm.13 Likewise, in his paper on smuggling 
in the post-Ottoman Levant titled “The Many Worlds of ‘Abud Yasin; or, What Narcotics 
Trafficking in the Interwar Middle East Can Tell Us about Territorialization, ” Cyrus Schayegh 
laments that drug traffickers and other “[i]ndividuals who regularly cross borders fall through the 
cracks of new nation-state analytical frameworks or are summarily integrated into them.”14 As 
Hanioğlu, Kayalı, and Schayegh demonstrate, the impact of examining the modern Middle 
East—its territory, peoples, and archives—through the nation state framework has fostered 
significant gaps in region scholarship and, in particular, the study of transnational illicit activities 
like the interwar opiate trade between Turkey and Egypt. 
Regional Historiographies and the Interwar Opiate Trade  
 In using the narratives of Egyptians and Turks to construct a transnational history of the 
interwar Eastern Mediterranean opiate trade, this research engages, connects, and informs a 
number of regional historiographies. First, both Egyptian and Turkish accounts of the interwar 
opiate trade contribute to the regional history of the Great Depression. As economic historian 
Şevket Pamuk notes in A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century: 
                                                 
12 Hanioğlu, Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 1. 
13 Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamismin the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 10. 
14 Cyrus Schayegh, “The Many Worlds of ‘Abud Yasin; Or, What Narcotics Trafficking in the Interwar Middle East 
Can Tell Us about Territorialization,” The American Historical Review 116, no. 2 (April 1, 2011): 274. 
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The period from 1918-1945 was exceptionally difficult for the society and economy of 
Turkey. Before the country could fully recover from the devastation of a decade of war 
which brought about the end of the Ottoman Empire and led to the emergence of a new 
nation state, it was hit by the Great Depression and the collapse of the world market for 
agricultural commodities.15  
 
Building on Pamuk sketch of interwar Turkey, this history shows that during this “exceptionally 
difficult” period Turkey emerged as the world’s foremost purveyor of opiates and the source of 
the majority of narcotics consumed in Egypt.16 Similarly, the years following the 1929 economic 
crisis marked a period of intense economic strain in Egypt that triggered increased rates of 
poverty, political radicalization, and, according to Lucie Ryzova’s The Age of the Efendiyya, led 
the country’s middle class to “question the very foundations of the regime.”17 As the history of 
the interwar drug trade and epidemic suggests, these conditions also led thousands of Egyptians, 
from peasants to politicians, to turn to the opiate economy for financial and political 
opportunities.  
Second, the opiate trade sheds light on processes of state development in interwar Egypt 
and Turkey. Although Egypt gained increased autonomy during the interwar period, it still faced 
de-facto British dominance and, as Beth Baron demonstrates in The Orphan Scandal: Christian 
Missionaries and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, witnessed intense competition between 
foreign missionaries, Muslim activists, and the state over the country’s social welfare system.18 
The history of the Egyptian opiate epidemic shows how public security and health concerns, 
such as drug trafficking and consumption, played into the process of institutional development 
                                                 
15Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 1998), 10.  
16 Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report for the Year 1930, IX and 20. 
17 For increased poverty rates and political radicalization see: Owen and Pamuk, A History of Middle East 
Economies in the Twentieth Century, 39. M. W. Daly and Carl F. Petry, eds., The Cambridge History of Egypt 
(Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 328. Lucie Ryzova, The Age of the Efendiyya: 
Passages to Modernity in National-Colonial Egypt (OUP Oxford, 2014), 243.  
18 Daly and Petry, The Cambridge History of Egypt, 285-308 and Beth Baron, The Orphan Scandal: Christian 
Missionaries and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood (Stanford University Press, 2014), 8 
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by providing leverage for local bureaucrats and politicians in the negotiations with the semi-
colonial Egyptian state. Likewise, Turkey embarked on a path of statism during the early 1930s 
in response to years of unfavorable economic growth and poor global market conditions.19 The 
Egyptian opiate epidemic and the wave of diplomatic and media pressure that followed 
contributed to a sustained international drug control campaign that forced Turkey to establish an 
official government narcotics monopoly, which embodied and likely funded further development 
of the country’s state-owned industries and institutions.  
Third, the opiate trade provides a window into foreign relations between Turkey and 
Egypt during the interwar period. While various studies examine early Republican Turkey’s 
diplomatic overtures to Europe (in particular Britain and France) and the Soviet Union, a dearth 
of scholarship exists on the country’s early foreign relations with the Arab world.20 Moreover, as 
Fred Lawson demonstrates in his article titled “Reassessing Egypt’s Foreign Policy during the 
1920s and 1930s,” although Egyptian government officials and politicians actively engaged in 
diplomacy during this period, “[e]xisting scholarship asserts that political leaders in Cairo 
exhibited little if any interest in diplomatic and strategic relations with surrounding states prior to 
the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance in August 1936.”21 Similar to Lawson’s 
conclusions, the actions of the CNIB, Egyptian diplomats, politicians, and the journalists 
demonstrate a keen interest and knowledge of foreign affairs. Likewise, rather than showing 
disregard for the Arab world, Turkish government documents exhibit Ankara’s great concern 
about events in Cairo as well as the actions and statements of Egyptian diplomats and journalists. 
                                                 
19 Owen and Pamuk, 18-20. 
20 See William M. Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774 (Routledge, 2013). 
21 Arthur Goldschmidt, Amy J. Johnson, and Barak A. Salmoni, Re-Envisioning Egypt 1919-1952 (American Univ 
in Cairo Press, 2005), 46. 
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Taken together, the intersection of the opiate trade and these historiographies comments 
on the overarching narratives of interwar Egypt and Turkey. In Egypt, the period roughly 
corresponds with the beginning of what historians refer to as the “Liberal Era” of constitutional 
monarchy, which existed between the 1919 Egyptian revolution and the 1952 Free Officers’ 
Coup. Although post-coup nationalist historiographies often dismiss this period as a “liberal 
experiment,” Barak Salmoni and Amy Johnson argue that it “exhibits a cultural vibrancy, 
societal dynamism, and intellectual political legacy” in their edited series on the period, Re-
Envisioning Egypt 1919-1952.22 Despite the immense social problems that the interwar opiate 
trade and epidemic created, the ability of Egyptians, form peasants to politicians, to seize upon 
these phenomena for economic and political gain concurs with Salmoni and Johnson’s 
assessment.  
Turkish historiography reflects a similar lack of consensus about the country’s early 
Republican era. As Feroz Ahmad reflects in his essay, “Politics and Political Parties in 
Republican Turkey,” historians still fiercely debate the extent to which the founding of the 
Turkish Republic represents continuity or change.23 On one hand, the Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 
İsmet İnönü, and other high-ranking republican officials emerged as products of the Ottoman 
system. On the other, Turkey dramatically transformed from an Islamic Empire into a secular 
nation-state during this period. Turkey’s approach to the interwar opiate trade and the epidemic 
in Egypt suggests a combination of both theories. As the Ottoman State, the country continued to 
engage in the opiate trade, established an official government narcotics monopoly, and 
maintained strong diplomatic ties to Egypt. However, unlike the Ottoman state, Republican 
                                                 
22 Goldschmidt, Johnson, and Salmoni, Re-Envisioning Egypt 1919-1952, 3. 
23 Reşat Kasaba, ed., The Cambridge History of Turkey, 1 edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
226. 
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Turkey participated in multilateral drug control negotiations and introduced narcotics regulations 
in response to international pressure.  
Opiates and State Development in the Interwar Eastern Mediterranean 
Beyond Egyptian, Turkish, and broader Middle Eastern historiography, this research also 
draws on and contributes to an increasingly complex body of scholarship concerning the 
relationship between narcotics and state-formation in the modern world. While historians and 
political economists have long studied the connections between commodities, such as cotton and 
oil, and state development, only recently have they begun to look at narcotics in the same light.24 
In Moral Nation: Modern Japan and Narcotics in Global History, for example, Miriam 
Kingsberg examines how regulating narcotics shaped Japan’s political legitimacy as a “moral 
nation” and empire.25 Furthermore, Ryan Gingeras’ Heroin, Organized Crime, and the Making of 
Modern Turkey gives heroin “discursive legitimacy” in contending that it cemented a symbiotic 
relationship between Turkish government officials and organized crime in modern Turkey that 
exists to this day.26 
While Kingsberg and Gingeras focus on vastly different regions and topics, both scholars 
approach narcotics as central to state formation. Similar to their work, the following research 
places opiates at the center of interwar Eastern Mediterranean history. By giving opiates 
“discursive legitimacy,” this work traces their trajectory across countries and through the hands 
of an array of actors including traffickers, consumers, police, politicians, and diplomats.27 These 
actors connect opiates to unique processes of state-building, such as ‘Egyptianization’ and 
                                                 
24 For the links between cotton and development, or lack of, in Egypt see Roger Owen, Cotton and the Egyptian 
Economy, 1820-1914: A Study in Trade and Development (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1969). 
25 Miriam Kingsberg, Moral Nation: Modern Japan and Narcotics in Global History (Univ of California Press, 
2013). 
26 Gingeras, Heroin, Organized Crime, and the Making of Modern Turkey, 3. 
27Gingeras, 3.  
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etatism, that illuminate the tangible, yet tangled, relationship between opiates and institutional 
development in interwar Turkey and Egypt.  
The following research demonstrates this complex and indirect relationship between 
narcotics and institutional development in interwar Egypt and Turkey. In the context interwar 
Egypt, it contends that commodities themselves did not fund institutional growth, but rather their 
sale and suppression influenced negotiations between factions within the semi-colonial 
government over the future direction of the Egyptian state. Unlike Egypt, the Turkish state 
directly profited from the sale of opiates. However, the institution through which Turkey 
controlled this trade also constituted a product of drug regulation. In fact, Turkey’s narcotics 
monopoly emerged out of the same commercial and regulatory forces that contributed to the 
development of Egypt’s drug enforcement and public health infrastructure during the interwar 
era. These forces demonstrate a dynamic in which both the sale and suppression of substances 
fuel institutional development. Therefore, they highlight the actions of not only politicians, 
diplomats, and bureaucrats, but also drug traffickers, dealers, and addicts in shaping the process 
of state building from the bottom up in interwar Egypt and Turkey. 
Chapter Outline 
This following research studies the impact of the interwar opiate trade and the subsequent 
epidemic on institutional development in Egypt and Turkey in two chapters. The first builds on 
the work of Gingeras, Kingsberg, as well as scholars of narcotics and state formation by 
highlighting the ‘Egyptianness’ of the interwar opiate trade and epidemic. It begins with a short 
section examining the Egyptian role in the interwar opiate economy as an important link in a 
transnational narcotic commodity chain. Drawing primarily on statistics from Egyptian 
government documents, this chapter then looks at Egyptian participation in the opiate trade as a 
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strategy to mitigate the adverse economic conditions that characterized life in interwar Egypt. 
Finally, it employs government reports and periodicals to demonstrate how Egyptian bureaucrats 
and politicians used the opiate epidemic to gain funding for institution development despite the 
stringent fiscal austerity of the Egyptian state. Ultimately, this chapter shows how Egyptians, 
from peddlers to politicians, promoted and policed the interwar opiate trade, shaped government 
responses to drug addition, and impacted institutional development in early twentieth century 
Egypt.  
The second chapter continues to explore the complex relationship between narcotics and 
state development by examining the impact of the interwar opiate trade and the ensuing epidemic 
in Egypt from a Turkish perspective. It begins with an overview of opium cultivation and 
regulation in the late Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish Republic. The first section provides 
context for a subsequent discussion of how interwar drug trafficking and, in particular, the 
growing international concern over opiate consumption in Egypt engendered significant policy 
shifts regarding Turkey’s narcotics industry. Drawing primarily on Turkish government reports, 
the following section highlights these changes and shows how continued Egyptian scrutiny, as 
part of a broader international effort targeting Turkey’s narcotics economy, contributed to a 
centralized and far more lucrative opiate industry in Turkey. This process, which culminated in 
the creation of Turkey’s Narcotics Substances Monopoly, demonstrates the complicated 
relationship between the Turkish narcotics trade and the Egyptian opiate epidemic. Incorporating 
Turkey into the history of the opiate trade in juxtaposition with Egypt, this chapter supplements 
the generally international narratives of interwar narcotics regulation with distinctly regional 
contours that expose the unexpected and somewhat counterintuitive consequences of promoting 
and policing the interwar Eastern Mediterranean opiate trade for regional state development. 
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Chapter 1: From Desperation to Development: Opiate Trafficking and State-
Building in Interwar Egypt 
In a memoir recounting his years as a British colonial civil servant in Egypt, Sir Thomas 
Wentworth Russell tells of a peculiar story involving heroin addicts, a barber, and the Cairo 
Antirabic Hospital. During the early 1930s, the doctor in charge of the hospital observed an odd 
trend among his patients. He noted that a number of the peasant-farmers (fellaḥin) admitted to 
the hospital hailed from one small village in the Egyptian Delta and, although they claimed to 
suffer from rabies, they actually came to the hospital seeking treatment for heroin addiction. 
Upon further investigation, government officials traced the trend back to a particular heroin user 
from the village who, following a stay at the Cairo hospital for the treatment of “mad dog bite,” 
returned home having overcome his desire for the drug.28 Seeking similar services, heroin users 
in the village consulted the local barber who, “being an ingenious man” according to Russell, 
equipped the jaw of a dead dog with a steel spring that provided village addicts with a distinctly 
canine bite pattern in order to persuade the local government doctor to send them to Cairo for 
rabies treatment.29 
The villagers’ desperate reaction to the dearth of public health services in rural areas of 
the country illustrates the scope and severity of opiate consumption in interwar Egypt. 
Throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, large quantities of primarily, but not exclusively, 
Turkish opiates flowed across the Eastern Mediterranean to Egypt. These substances, which 
ranged from heroin and morphine to less-common derivatives of opium, triggered an 
unprecedented opiate epidemic that swept through the country and claimed at least 500,000 out 
                                                 
28 Sir Thomas Wentworth Russell Pasha, Egyptian Service, 1902-1946, 1st ed. (London: J. Murray, 1949), 234-235. 
29 Russell, Egyptian Service, 1902-1946, 234-235. 
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of 14 million Egyptians as addicts.30 While the precipitous increase in the sale and consumption 
of opiates in interwar Egypt led to myriad social problems, they also created economic and 
political opportunities. This chapter shows how Egyptians, from peasants to politicians, used 
these opportunities as a means to relieve the local economic strains of the Great Depression and 
negotiate state institutional development by promoting and policing the interwar opiate trade. 
The Egyptian Epidemic and the Interwar Opiate Trade  
The burgeoning interwar opiate trade emerged during a period of great economic, 
political, and social upheaval that reshaped much of Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle 
East between roughly 1918 and 1939. In these regions, the aftermath of the First World War, the 
Great Depression, and their sweeping political reverberations contributed to an environment of 
economic desperation that heightened the appeal of opiate cultivation, refinement, and 
trafficking. Turkey, a country whose origins lie in the combined devastation of World War I, the 
Turkish War of Independence, forced migration, and intense internal social conflict, emerged as 
one of the world’s primary cultivators of raw opium during the 1920s.31 While Ottomanists note 
opium’s long history of exportation from Anatolia, in 1928 Turkish opium-cultivating regions 
such as Afyonkarahisar, Eskişehir, and Konya produced approximately 363,248 kilos of raw 
opium and during the late 1920s Turkey alone nearly supplied the demand from European opiate 
refiners.32 Although Switzerland, France, and Germany dominated the process of opiate 
                                                 
30 For Egyptian addiction figures see Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report for the Year 1929 31. In 
order to circumvent regulations restricting the export and import of heroin, refiners produced chemically unique 
substances such as ‘Benzylmorphine’ and ‘Dionyl.’ “UNODC - Bulletin on Narcotics - 1965 Issue 4 - 001,” 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1965-01-01_4_page002.html. 
31 Owen and Pamuk detail the economic state of the early Turkish Republic. Owen and Pamuk, 10. Block notes that: 
“As Turkey’s territory and national economic dwindled, the relative significance of opium production naturally 
increased.” Alan A. Block, “European Drug Traffic and Traffickers between the Wars: The Policy of Suppression 
and Its Consequences,” Journal of Social History 23, no. 2 (1989): 317-320.   
32 Both Gingeras and Poroy indicate that the beginning of large-scale opium exportation in Anatolia coincided with 
the period leading up to the First Opium War. Ryan Gingeras, “Beyond Istanbul’s ‘Laz Underworld’: Ottoman 
Paramilitarism and the Rise of Turkish Organised Crime, 1908–1950,” Contemporary European History 19, no. 
  17 
refinement until the late 1920s, international pressure from the League of Nations Advisory 
Committee on the Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous Drug (OAC) forced them to introduce 
stringent opiate manufacturing regulations and during the early 1930s Turkey absorbed their 
market share.33 With three alkaloid factories operating openly on the Bosporus that generated 
approximately one ton of heroin and morphine a month, in the early 1930s Istanbul emerged as 
the global epicenter of the highly lucrative illicit opiate trade and the source of the large majority 
of opiates trafficked into Egypt.34  
                                                                                                                                                             
Special Issue 03 (August 2010): 223. Ibrahim Ihsan Poroy, “Expansion of Opium Production in Turkey and the State 
Monopoly of 1828-1839,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 13, no. 2 (1981): 192. Information on 
regions of opiate cultivation in western Anatolia can be found in the 1931 CNIB Annual Report. Central Narcotics 
Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report for the Year 1929, 71. Block details the extent to which Turkey supplied 
European refinement. Block, 320. 
33 “Illicit Drug Trade,” The Times, January 23, 1930, The Times Digital Archive. 
34 While documents available at the Turkish Republic Archive (Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi) do not often 
directly address opiate trafficking between Turkey and Egypt, that fact that the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Hariciye Vekâleti) commissioned numerous translations of Egyptian press and government documents concerning 
this trade demonstrates, at least, the government’s awareness and keen interest in these affairs. Başbakanlık 
Cumhuriyet Arşivi (BCA) 30.10.0.0.180.243, 27 January 1931; BCA 30.10.0.0.180.243.12, 25 February 1931; BCA 
30.10.0.0.180.243.16, 19 May 1931; BCA 30.10.0.0.180.243.17, 24 May 1931; BCA 30.10.0.0.180.243.11, 1931 
(publication date and month illegible); BCA 30.10.0.0.266.796.16, 15 March 1933. Istanbul’s alkaloid output figures 
can be found in the 1930 CNIB Annual Report. Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report for the Year 
1930, IX and 20. 
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Motivated by the dire economic conditions across Europe, the Mediterranean, and the 
Middle East as well as the profitability of the opiate trade, diverse transnational networks formed 
to facilitate narcotics trafficking from Turkey to Egypt.35 Reports from the Egyptian Central 
Narcotics Intelligence Bureau (CNIB), which the Egyptian state created in 1929 to police the 
trade, divide these networks into the following four groups: large dealers of mainly Greek, 
British, Italian, French, and Egyptian extraction; large scale intermediaries of primarily Greek 
and Egyptian origins; almost exclusively Egyptian small scale dealers; and almost exclusively 
Egyptian small scale intermediaries.36 Employing ships of all sizes and types from passenger 
steamers to the Khedival Mail Line, these vast smuggling networks trafficked opiates from 
Turkish and European factories to the Mediterranean ports of Trieste, Naples, Piraeus, and 
                                                 
35 CNIB reports quantify the profitability of the opiate trade at the end of each Annual Report. Ibid., 101, Ibid., 
Annual Report for the Year 1931, 143, and Ibid., Annual Report for the Year 1932, 158.  
36 Ibid., Annual Report for the Year 1931, 64.  
Figure 8: Opiate factory in the Kuzguncuk neighborhood of Istanbul (1930).1 
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Beirut, and then on to points of entry into the large Egyptian consumer market such as 
Alexandria and Port Said.37  
Once inside Egypt, opiates quickly moved through networks of primarily Egyptian 
dealers and intermediaries to a consumer base that the CNIB estimated to constitute at least 
500,000 out of 14 million Egyptians in 1929.38 These users generally purchased opiates in 
powder form and consumed them via nasal insufflation (shamma) or intravenous injection 
(ḥaqana), for which they employed a variety of conventional and improvised apparatuses 
depending on their personal means.39 Sale and consumption of opiates grew most common in the 
coffee shops, alleyways, and shanties (‘ushash) of working-class areas such as the al-Zaher 
                                                 
37 To a lesser extent and for bulkier so-called “black drugs” (hashish and opium), traffickers used routes that traveled 
through Damietta, Lake Manzala, and Lake Burullus via fishing boats. Desert smuggling via the rail system and 
camels in the Sinai and the Western Desert was also common for “black drugs.” Ibid., XIV and 36-49. CNIB 
documents also indicate that traffickers used Cyprus as a depot for Turkish and Syrian narcotics headed to Egypt. 
Ibid., Annual Report for the Year 1932, 76.  
38 Ibid., Annual Report for the Year 1929, 31. 
39 In lieu of proper hypodermic needles, CNIB reports note that consumers often employed cheaper alternatives such 
as eyedroppers or fountain pen fillers attached to the tip of hypodermic needles. Ibid., Annual Report for the Year 
1931, 112. The weekly al-Muṣawwar vividly details the consumption process. Mohammed Aziz, “a-Samm al-Abyad 
Yubā‘ ‘Alanan fī a-Sawāri‘” (“The White Poison that is Sold Openly in the Streets”), al-Muṣawwar, January 4, 
1929. 
Figure 9: CNIB recreation showing how traffickers land contraband in Egypt.1 
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quarter of Bulaq in Cairo and the al-Hamamil neighborhood of Alexandria.40 Indeed, the 
February 19, 1932 edition of The Times of London demonstrates the extent to which the 
epidemic spread among the Egyptian working class in reporting on the “curiosity” of a Cairo 
contractor who paid his laborers wages in heroin.41  
Despite such reports, the epidemic was by no means solely a working class phenomenon. 
Owing to the relative affordability of opiates, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, their use diffused 
widely across Egyptian social strata, geographic regions, and among such disparate 
demographics as farmers, merchants, artisans, government clerks, and landlords.42 Writing for 
the weekly Egyptian current events magazine al-Muṣawwar, Mohammed Aziz conveys the wide 
socio-economic scope of opiate addiction in interwar Egypt by noting that the epidemic “has 
penetrated into the nation (sha‘b), striking the hand of the worker from artisans and farmers to 
the enlightened.”43 Sir Thomas Russell, who served as both Cairo Police chief and director of the 
CNIB from 1929-1946, reinforces Aziz’s claim in writing with palpable distaste while describing 
a working class neighborhood of Cairo that “the Bulaq settling pit quickly filled with the human 
debris from every class of Egyptian society.”44 While this broad socio-economic and geographic 
impact highlights the immense challenges that the epidemic posed for the Egyptian state and 
society, it also indicates the size and profitability of the opiate economy in interwar Egypt. 
                                                 
40 Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report for the Year, 1931, 45-54, Russell, 223-224, and 
Mohammed Aziz, “a-Samm al-Abyad Yuba‘ ‘Alanan fī a-Sawari‘” (“The White Poison that is Sold Openly in the 
Streets”), al-Muṣawwar, January 4, 1929. 
41 OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT, “Drug Traffic In Egypt,” The Times, February 19, 1932, The Times Digital 
Archive. 
42 Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report for the Year, 1932, 114. 
43 Mohammed Aziz, “a-Samm al-Abyad Yubā‘ ‘Alanan fī a-Sawāri‘” (“The White Poison that is Sold Openly in the 
Streets”), al-Muṣawwar, January 4, 1929. 
44 Russell, 224. 
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Opiate Trafficking and the Great Depression 
 Beyond contributing to numerous social problems in interwar Egypt, the opiate epidemic 
also presented attractive economic opportunities for many Egyptians. While hundreds of 
thousands of Egyptians consumed opiates during the late 1920s and early 1930s, thousands more 
worked as traffickers, dealers, intermediaries, drug mules, and hired injectors.45 Similar to the ill 
effects of the trade, these opportunities spanned social strata as well as geographic and 
professional divides.46 Through their participation in the local opiate economy, farmers, laborers, 
young professionals, and countless others formed profitable networks that helped them relieve 
the acute strains that the 1929 global crisis placed on the Egyptian economy. 
As in the United States, Europe, and across the world, the Great Depression severely 
damaged the Egyptian economy. The economic crisis of 1929 and the ensuing collapse of 
international markets devastated the Egyptian agricultural sector, which constituted 
approximately two-thirds of the country’s gross domestic product throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century.47 Sharp declines in the value of cotton contributed to high rates of rural 
poverty and disease that triggered large numbers of Egyptian peasant-famers to migrate to urban 
areas in search of work in newly established industries.48 Egyptian industrial development 
however, neither quickly created jobs nor did it increase national income, while tariffs 
introduced to protect local industries increased the price of foodstuffs upon which the lower 
classes depended.49 Consequently, Egyptian peasant-farmers and the urban working class 
                                                 
45 CNIB records indicate the arrest of 7,098 individuals for trafficking offenses during the period between 
6/16/1929-12/31/1933. Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report for the Year, 1932, 113 and Ibid., 
Annual Report for the Year, 1933, 96.  
46 Ibid., Annual Report for the Year, 1933, 112-125. 
47 Daly and Petry, 321. Owen and Pamuk, 30-31. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Daly and Petry, 322. Owen and Pamuk, 39. 
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experienced increasing poverty rates during the interwar era, which, statistics suggest, 
encouraged many to seek economic opportunities in the illicit opiate trade.50 
However, the severe impact of the 1929 crisis was not confined to Egyptian peasant-
farmers and the urban working class. The Great Depression also stunted the upward mobility of 
the Egyptian professional class by eliminating many of the middle class jobs on which these 
aspiring administrators and clerks depended.51 Their frustrated social rise eventually, historians 
have argued, translated into political radicalization as this demographic questioned the economic 
and political systems that had ostensibly destroyed its dreams of middle class prosperity.52 While 
the crisis of 1929 moved the effendiyyah to the extremes of the Egyptian political spectrum, 
economic dislocation similarly pushed them from the center to the margins of the labor force 
and, as data from CNIB reports indicates, encouraged many to engage in drug trafficking. 
Despite the difficulty in determining the precise extent to which working and middle 
class Egyptians participated in opiate trafficking, CNIB statistics from the height of the epidemic 
indicate that these groups played a large role in the drug trade in relation to other demographics. 
For example, CNIB records from 1933 indicate that the Egyptian Native Tribunals and the 
Courts of the Frontiers Administration charged a total of 322 Egyptians citizens (as opposed to 
foreigners and foreign-residents charged in the Consular or Mixed Courts) with trafficking 
narcotics.53 The record, which provides the trade of each accused individual, demonstrates that 
the large majority of the 322 Egyptians charged with trafficking narcotics in 1933 (298/322 or 
~93%) maintained regular employment as street hawkers, Qur’an reciters, coffee sellers, 
                                                 
50 Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report for the Year, 1933, 112-125 and Owen and Pamuk, 39. 
51 Daly and Petry, 328. 
52 In his essay on Egyptian society and economy from 1923-1952, Joel Beinin argues that the Great Depression 
damaged the Egyptian economy and with it liberal democracy, which attributed to the radicalization of politics in 
1930s. Ibid. 
53 Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report for the Year, 1933, 112-125.  
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laborers, greengrocers, farmers, camel drivers, gravediggers, and other working class 
occupations.54 Out of the remaining accused individuals, all but one (23/322, ~7%) held middle 
class or professional positions such as examiners, clerks, and merchants of various types.55 
Furthermore, CNIB statistics show that the most common occupations among drug traffickers in 
1933 were those of hawker, laborer, and merchant.56 As these trades either represented the 
margins of the Egyptian economy or, in the case of merchants, were highly susceptible to the 
severe economic fluctuations that the Great Depression triggered, these figures suggests that 
working and middle class Egyptians alike attempted to supplement their income and alleviate the 
intense economic hardship that characterized the period by engaging in drug trafficking. 
                                                 
54 This number of traffickers includes 39 unemployed individuals. The one individual excluded from the 322 was a 
“commissioner.” Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 1933, 114-125. 
56 Ibid. 
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In addition to the relationship between economic sectors that suffered during the Great 
Depression and the trades of accused Egyptian drug traffickers, the average age of individuals 
involved in narcotics smuggling indicates that young Egyptians also turned to the opiate trade to 
mitigate the impact of the 1929 crisis. While the CNIB offers no definitive data about the age of 
narcotics smugglers alone, its figures from the years 1929-1933 put the age of the vast majority 
of traffickers and addicts that the bureau arrested or admitted to state rehabilitation facilities 
between the years 21-35.57 Beyond these statistics, CNIB reports also detail numerous instances 
of Egyptian youths smuggling narcotics aboard steamships that traveled along the route from 
Istanbul to Alexandria and Port Said.58 In July 1931, for example, the bureau exposed a so-called 
“gang of youths” who together routinely smuggled between 2-3 kilograms of heroin into the port 
of Alexandria for the “notorious international trafficker” Dimitri “al-Hulwani” (the confectioner) 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 98 and Ibid., Annual Report for the Year 1932, 115. 
58 Ibid., 40-43 and Ibid., Annual Report for the Year 1931, 6-9. 
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Leboutis and his “very dangerous” right-hand man Sayed “al-Torabi” (the grave-digger).59 This 
“gang” comprised both young men and women, the latter of which used special stockings to 
conceal the opiates on their persons.60 Such cases demonstrate that for Egyptian youth, as for all 
Egyptians suffering from economic hardship during the late 1920s and early 1930s, the 
profitability of the opiate trade presented tempting possibilities. 
 
In fact, the CNIB’s yearly reports went to great lengths to outline, quantify, and quality 
these possibilities. By combining data concerning the cost of opiates collected from government 
officials throughout the country, each year the bureau determined the profitability of the opiate 
trade.61 Following an exhaustive display of empiricism spread out across numerous pages of 
                                                 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
61 These figures, which come from data collected by ‘umad (sing. ‘umda), shuyukh al-balad, and police 
officers, of course served the dual purpose of demonstrating the continued need for the Egyptian Government to 
Figure 10: Special stockings concealing opiates (1931).1 
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graphs, charts, and equations, every year this section of the Annual Report concluded by 
determining that “profits in this business are still attractive” or, as the report concluded in 1932, 
“extremely attractive.”62 Even the Egyptian weekly al-Laṭā’if al-Muṣawwar, which generally 
featured articles criticizing the work and expenditures of the CNIB, concurred with this 
assessment by placing the street value of one ton of opiates in 1930 at “millions of pounds.”63 
In addition to the CNIB’s quantitative approach, the bureau’s reports also offer 
qualitative examples of the trade’s profitability and lure. For instance, CNIB reports feature the 
story of an Egyptian drug trafficker that the bureau arrested in 1931 who it estimated to have 
accumulated L.E. 150,000 (a figure equivalent to $12,198,807 today) over the span of just a few 
years.64 “Among the evidence obtained in the enquiry,” the director explained in a speech to the 
League of Nations OAC, was “a document to show that seven years ago a judicial saisie was 
made upon him for unpaid alimony to his wife, and the forced sale of his household goods 
brought in the total sum of L.E. 37.”65 The incredible profits that this trafficker amassed over a 
period of just a few years reinforce the CNIB’s claim concerning the lucrative nature of the 
interwar Egyptian opiate trade while demonstrating its great appeal to individuals susceptible to 
the harsh economic conditions that characterized life for many Egyptians during the 1930s. 
The Interwar Opiate Epidemic and Egyptian Institutional Development 
Beyond the economic opportunities that the interwar opiate trade generated for working 
and middle class Egyptians to mitigate the impact of the Great Depression, the resulting opiate 
                                                                                                                                                             
fund the CNIB. Ibid., Annual Report for the Year 1930, 101, Ibid., Annual Report for the Year 1931, 143, and Ibid., 
Annual Report for the Year 1932, 158.  
62 Ibid.  
63 “al-Ittijār bil- Mukhadarāt wa ‘Aṣabat al-Umam” (“The Trade in Narcotics and the League of Nations”), al-Laṭā’if 
al-Muṣawwar, January 7, 1930. 
64 The Egyptian pound (L.E. or EGP) was pegged to the British pound (GBP) at a rate of 0.975 to 1 from 1914-1962. 
Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report for the Year 1931, 148 and “Historical UK Inflation Rates and 
Calculator,” Historical UK Inflation Rates and Calculator, http://inflation.stephenmorley.org/. 
65 Ibid.  
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epidemic also served as a catalyst for political activity that strengthened the ongoing Egyptian 
effort to develop state institutions and social welfare programs. Reacting to the dramatic spread 
of opiate consumption in interwar Egypt, local bureaucrats and politicians overcame the stringent 
fiscal conservatism of the semi-colonial Egyptian state to build and develop government 
institutions that employed and served Egyptians. This development led to the creation of 
enforcement institutions like the CNIB and improved public health services providing treatment 
for narcotics addiction. While part of the larger push for institutional development that 
corresponded with increases in Egyptian autonomy during the early 1920s, this process marked a 
significant departure from the trends that had characterized Egyptian economic policy since the 
beginning of the British occupation.66 
Throughout the British occupation of Egypt, London enforced a program of economic 
austerity that aimed to ensure repayment of the Egyptian debt.67 Above all else, this program 
emphasized a balanced budget and provided little funding for education or social services.68 Due 
to the lack of public health services and the liberal British policy towards foreign missionaries, 
missionary activity expanded widely in Egypt during the 1920s.69 This provoked a backlash from 
both Muslim activists and the state officials that lead each group to create their own social 
welfare system.70 With increased Egyptian autonomy and the Egyptianization of the state 
bureaucracy during the 1920s, investment in previously neglected social services emerged as the 
top priority of Egyptian politicians and administrators.71 However, with de-facto British 
                                                 
66 Owen and Pamuk, 36-38.   
67 Daly and Petry, 240.  
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dominance over Egyptian domestic policy continuing to frustrate such efforts, the exigencies of 
the interwar opiate epidemic strengthened the Egyptian drive for institutional development.72  
The CNIB emerged as the first product of Egyptian efforts to develop and strengthen 
state institutions while addressing the interwar opiate epidemic. In 1929 Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mahmud Pasha established the CNIB in response to the scope and severity of the 
interwar opiate epidemic and, according to a 1929 article in al-Muṣawwar announcing the 
bureau’s formation, he molded the CNIB “in the fashion of the office that was founded in the 
Ministry of the Interior for resisting Communism and the struggle against its propagandists.”73 
The goals of the CNIB were fourfold: to identify the source of drugs imported into Egypt, to 
present facts to the League of Nations, to prosecute traffickers in Egypt, and to inhibit smuggling 
in a way that would increase the price of substances beyond the threshold of affordability for 
Egyptian peasant-farmers.74 To achieve these aims, the Egyptian government provided the CNIB 
with an annual budget of L.E. 10,000 and direct access to all government departments as well as 
the ability to coordinate directly with foreign public security authorities.75 
Although CNIB records do not indicate the precise number or the nationality of its 
employees and British civil servants occupied top administrative positions within the 
organization, Egyptians constituted the majority of CNIB staff. Below CNIB director Russell 
Pasha, Egyptians performed a multitude of functions as constables, detectives, clerks, translators, 
undercover agents, and informants for the bureau.76 During the peak years of the epidemic from 
1929-1933, CNIB records indicate that the bureau opened branches throughout the country, 
                                                 
72 Selma Botman demonstrates the nature and extent of continued British involvement in Egyptian politics in here 
chapter on Egypt’s “Liberal Age.” Daly and Petry, 285-308.   
73 Russell, 225-226. “Maktab al-Mukhadarāt” (“Bureau of Narcotics”), al-Muṣawwar, March 29, 1929. 
74 Russell’s memoirs are full of romantic images of the Egyptian peasant-farmer (fellaḥ), who Russell and many of 
his British contemporaries seemed to view through the colonial lens of ‘noble savagery,’ but, in reality, constituted 
an integral part of the commodity chain supplying cotton to Manchester mills. Russell, 226. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Russell, 225-226. Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, Annual Report for the Year 1931, 144.  
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created new relationships with domestic and international enforcement agencies, produced an 
increasing number of documents, and hired more Egyptians to staff the lower ranks of its 
organization.77  
Established in August 1930, the CNIB branch in Alexandria best exhibits the trajectory of 
the institution’s development.78 Due to Alexandria’s central position in regional drug trafficking 
as a point of entry into the large Egyptian market, the CNIB hired a number of Egyptian 
employees to perform clerical and investigative work in coordination with local police and port 
authorities.79 The investigative work of one such employee, detective Ahmed Ali Bahloul, 
appears prominently in the CNIB Annual Report for the Year 1931 due to his unfortunate passing 
after a being struck with a flower pot hurled from the balcony of a hashish den during a 
stakeout.80 Bahloul, who constituted the first CNIB officer killed while performing his duties, 
demonstrates both the significant and often dangerous role that Egyptians played in policing the 
drug trafficking on behalf of the CNIB as well as a physical manifestation of Egyptian 
institutional development stemming from the opiate epidemic.81  
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While government responses to the epidemic stimulated the growth of enforcement 
institutions such as the CNIB, they also led to increased funding for Egyptian public health and 
social services. This money funded research concerning narcotics consumption, improved 
existing public health services, and helped provide treatment for addiction. However, unlike the 
creation of enforcement agencies such as the CNIB, funding for public health and social services 
emerged as a major point of contention between the British civil servants and local bureaucrats.  
These disputes illuminate both the process of negotiation that occurred between austerity-minded 
British advisors and pro-development (or pro-Egyptianization) parties within the state over the 
Figure 11: CNIB officer and detectives in reconstructed scene of trafficker injecting 
addicts (1933).1 
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trajectory of institutional growth in Egypt as well as the impact of the interwar opiate epidemic 
on such discussions.  
The most significant of these discussions concerned the development of institutions, 
services, and policies to provide and improve treatment for Egyptian opiate addicts. As early as 
1927, the Egyptian Prisons Department proposed to implement a policy to treat opiate users in a 
clinical setting rather than continuing to incarcerate them en masse.82 Whether due to lack of 
urgency in the years prior to the opiate epidemic or fiscal concerns, these proposed changes did 
not come to fruition. However, as the Egyptian press began to cover the spreading opiate 
epidemic in 1929 with gripping headlines such as “The White Poison that is Sold Openly in the 
Streets,” it also published a series of feature stories and op-ed pieces demonstrating public 
support for a medical approach to opiate addiction.83 In early January 1929, for example, an al-
Muṣawwar article titled “The Rehabilitation of Narcotic Substance Addicts” laid out the 
following case for the hospitalization of drug addicts: 
Those imprisoned for drug possession with the aim of consumption [as opposed to 
trafficking]–and their numbers reach an upward of 2,500–are now carrying out their 
sentences in prisons or in hospitals attached to them. However, experiences indicate that 
the current condition of [Egyptian] prisons does not allow those seeking to rehabilitate 
incarcerated addicts to do so in a way that suits their state of health. These prisoners must 
all be discharged from the current institutions and placed in a special “reformatory” built 
on a system more closely resembling that of a hospital than a prison. The advantage to 
[reforming] the prisons is sufficiently clear that the honorable general director [of the 
Prisons Department] wrote a report last year suggesting the construction of the 
aforementioned reformatory…Indeed, those addicted to narcotic substances are sick 
(marḍa) and not criminals. Therefore, prisons do not benefit, but rather harm them.84 
 
That same month similar articles appeared in al-Muṣawwar calling for the “need for these 
wretches to be treated by the medical profession” as well as for “the acceleration of the 
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construction of this [aforementioned] reformatory.”85 These articles demonstrate that medical 
approaches to narcotics addiction held great currency among readership of al-Muṣawwar and 
perhaps among the great number of Egyptians concerned with the rise in opiate consumption.      
Working in this environment of favorable public opinion that the epidemic fostered, in 
1931 Director-General Tawfiq Abdulla Pasha reiterated the Egyptian Prison Department’s 
proposal for a reformatory and set forward detailed plans for such as facility.86 These plans 
called for the government to construct a “special Sanatorium” featuring a multiple step 
rehabilitation program that would combine various treatment strategies including medical 
procedures, moral support, drug education, professional training, and psychological treatment.87 
Additionally, Tawfiq advocated judicial reforms based on the recommendations of addiction 
treatment studies from around the world that would allow for addicts to receive “indeterminate 
sentences” to his proposed institution and for their release to be conditional upon the Prison 
Department declaring them cured.88 Tawfiq Pasha’s proposal however, elicited a series of 
aggressive responses from fiscally conservative British advisors to the Egyptian state. 
 In response to Tawfiq’s proposal, the Director of the Lunacy Division, Dr. H.W. 
Dudgeon, advocated concentrating state funds on continuing to wipe out the opiate trade rather 
than exerting “tremendous effort and much money…to guard this class [of drug users] against 
themselves.”89 Such a plan, he argued, would simply deprive the mentally ill of adequate care.90 
As Dr. Dudgeon, CNIB Assistant Director Miralai Baker Bey came to similar conclusions. 
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Citing a New York study showing high rates of relapse among rehab patients as well as the “the 
large outlay involved in setting up...such clinics,” the “average type of addict in this country and 
his value to society,” and the “present financial stringency,” Baker Bey argued that, unless the 
Egyptian government passed legislation insuring detention of addicts for a certain period (which 
Tawfiq Pasha suggested) such plans should be “indefinitely pigeon-holed.”91  
Despite strong objections from Dr. Dudgeon and Baker Bey, the Prisons Department 
eventually prevailed upon the Egyptian government to fund a sanatorium project. During the 
early 1930s the Egyptian Parliament allocated a total of L.E. 10,000 to organize, staff, and equip 
a rehabilitation center in Matariyyah under the administration of the Lunacy Division of the 
Public Health Department.92 Furthermore, in coordination with the Public Health Department it 
appears that the Prisons Department also effected judicial changes in 1931 allowing the state to 
hospitalize many of the addicts that voluntarily sought care in state mental facilities rather than 
incarcerating them for drug use.93 Dr. Dudgeon, for his part, continued to lament the strains that 
addiction treatment put on the mental health system in Egypt, stating in 1932 that four new 
pavilions finished and added to the Khanka Asylum “would have considerably alleviated the 
overcrowding if it had not been for the admission of the 500 drug cases.”94 However, CNIB 
reports demonstrate that this reform relieved severe overcrowding in the Cairo Central Prison 
system, which, due to arrests for opiate possession and consumption, grew to twenty-five percent 
overcapacity in the early 1930s.95 Additionally, a 1933 report from the Turkish Directorate of 
Prime Ministry Transactions (Başvekâlet Muamelât Müdürlüğü) approving an Egyptian request 
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for Turkey to repatriate Egyptians found “guilty of poppy trafficking” ([h]aşhaş kaçakçılığından 
suçlu) suggests that these measures allowed the state to expand and refine its narcotics 
enforcement policies.96 
 While these developments may have resulted in only small improvements in care for drug 
users and the general prison population, they represent significant victories for local bureaucrats 
in their push to develop Egyptian state institutions. The extension of addiction treatment to 
voluntarily admitted patients and the allocation of funds for a rehabilitation center demonstrate 
that state building in interwar Egypt constituted a process of negotiation between British civil 
servants and Egyptian officials. Although the fierce opposition of British civil servants to 
institutional development and acute national economic strain often shaped this process, these 
negotiations were not immune to the influence of public opinion. Therefore, this case conveys 
how popular anxiety over events such as the interwar opiate epidemic created not only problems 
for Egyptian bureaucrats and politicians to address, but also opportunities to overcome British 
opposition and strengthen their call for continued Egyptianization of state institutions in a period 
of severe economic hardship.   
Chapter Conclusion 
From the fellaḥin and the effendiyyah to local bureaucrats and politicians, the interwar 
period represented an era of intense economic strain for the large majority of Egyptians. While 
the working and middle classes faced increasing poverty rates and dwindling professional 
options, bureaucrats and politicians fiercely contended with the stringent fiscal conservatism of 
the semi-colonial Egyptian state. For each of these groups the interwar opiate trade presented 
timely economic opportunities. Though promoting and policing the subsequent opiate epidemic, 
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Egyptians pragmatically satisfied the economic and political exigencies of the interwar era while 
intentionally and unintentionally contributing to their country’s process of institutional 
development. 
This chapter demonstrates the diverse entrepreneurial and administrative roles that 
Egyptians played in the interwar opiate trade. Focusing on the perspectives of local traffickers, 
police, bureaucrats, and politicians, it frames Egyptians not simply as victims of foreign poison, 
but as participants in a profitable transnational trade. This analysis both complicates previous 
histories of Egypt’s interwar opiate epidemic as well as illuminates the economic and political 
impacts of Egyptian participation in the trade. By examining how local bureaucrats and 
politicians used public anxiety over the epidemic to support their ongoing institutional 
development efforts, it also reveals the complex relationship between narcotics and state building 
in interwar Egypt. During this period, both the sale and suppression of opiates shaped local 
debates over Egyptian institutional growth. The actions of Egyptian smugglers, statesmen, and 
even barbers, therefore, not only impacted the interwar opiate trade and defined government 
responses to narcotics consumption, but also influenced the trajectory of their state in the early 
twentieth century.  
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Chapter 2: Diplomacy and Development: The Opiate Trade and State-
Building in Interwar Turkey 
In January of 1931, at the height of the Egyptian opiate epidemic, the Turkish 
Ambassador to Egypt Muhittin Akyüz Pasha paid a visit to Egyptian Foreign Minister Abdel 
Fattah Yahiya Pasha to discuss an unsettling caricature that appeared on the front page of the 
local satirical magazine al-Kashkul during the previous month.97 Yahiya initially apologized to 
Muhittin for the cartoon and conveyed to the ambassador that he had already arranged with the 
Egyptian Interior Ministry for the incident to “not repeat itself.” 98 Yahiya subsequently 
downplayed the significance of the caricature by requesting that it “not be given to much 
importance, as al-Kashkul is a satirical magazine.”99 On the contrary however, the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the cartoon a matter of great importance that warranted 
the attention of the Republic’s top policy makers. In a report to the Prime Minster’s Office in 
Ankara dated January 27, 1931, the Ministry described the cartoon as “a very hurtful, extremely 
ugly, and insolent picture of his Excellency, the President of our Republic, the Victorious 
[Mustafa Kemal Atatürk] representing the nation with a bag full of opium in his hands and 
money from selling opium at his sides, under which [it reads] verbatim: ‘Oh Victorious 
[Atatürk], with all these rewards, does Islam remain our religion?’ To which his Excellency 
responds: ‘Fools, our religion is money.’”100  
 Beyond Turkish sensitivity to irreverent depictions of the country’s leader, the Foreign 
Minister’s austere response to al-Kashkul’s caustic caricature highlights the impact of mounting 
Egyptian pressure on Turkey’s opiate industry during the interwar period. Throughout the late 
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1920s and early 1930s opium cultivators, refiners, and traffickers operating in Turkey greatly 
profited from the opiate trade and, in particular, their proximity to Egypt’s large narcotics 
consumer base. As profits from Turkey’s opiate exports grew, so too did Egyptian condemnation 
of the unregulated industry. Egyptian voices contributed to a growing tide of international 
diplomatic, economic, and popular pressure that eventually prevailed upon Turkey to introduce a 
narcotics control regime in the early 1930s.101 Turkey’s subsequent move to regulate and 
monopolize its domestic opiate industry had transformative effects on the trade that reverberated 
throughout the Turkish government and fueled its emerging program of statist economic policies. 
The following chapter examines the impact of the epidemic in Egypt on the opiate trade in 
Turkey as well as the republic’s economy and institutional development. 
Opiate Cultivation and Regulation in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Republican 
Turkey  
While opium has a long history of cultivation in Anatolia and other Indo-Mediterranean 
societies, Ottomanists trace the large-scale exportation of the crop to the decade leading up to the 
First Opium War (1839-1842).102 The illicit opium trade in Qing China not only led to a 
belligerent display of British gunboat diplomacy that forced the continued importation of opium 
upon the last imperial dynasty to rule China, but also stimulated the opiate export market in the 
Ottoman Empire. With diffuse networks of primarily British and American merchants 
connecting Western Anatolian opium cultivators to Chinese consumers, the Ottoman opium 
economy proliferated during the early-mid nineteenth century.103 Cultivation in Anatolia 
increased from approximately 154,000 kilograms in 1836 to 731,253 kilograms in I877 and 
                                                 
101 BCA 30.18.1.2.32.80.7 25 December 1932. 
 102 Both Gingeras and Poroy indicate that the beginning of large-scale opium exportation in Anatolia coincided with 
period leading up to the First Opium War. Ryan Gingeras, “Beyond Istanbul’s ‘Laz Underworld,’” 223 and Poroy, 
192.  
103 Poroy, 192. 
  38 
Ottoman opium grew to account for over ten percent of that consumed in Qing China during the 
mid nineteenth century.104 Due to the vast quantities of opium cultivated in Anatolia, opium 
emerged as an integral part of the Ottoman economy during the early-mid nineteenth century. 
The lucrative nature of opium cultivation in early-mid nineteenth century Anatolia 
eventually drew the attention of Mahmud II’s reform-minded Ottoman State, which engaged in 
the first attempt to regulate the Anatolian opium economy. In 1828, Mahmud II enforced an 
official monopoly (Yed-i Vahit) on all opium under cultivation in Anatolia in order to more 
effectively tax the trade in 1828.105 The monopoly served as an important source of funds for the 
Ottoman state’s ongoing military reforms such as the Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye army, 
which Mahmud II created to replace the increasingly rebellious Janissary corps.106 Although the 
Yed-i Vahit suffered from a lack of economic and political support since its inception and British 
diplomatic pressure eventually induced the Ottoman state to end its agricultural monopoly 
system in 1838, Anatolian opium and its proceeds diffused throughout the Eastern 
Mediterranean, Europe, East Asia, and North America during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. 107 In this way, the opium trade not only connected the Ottoman Empire to 
global narcotics markets, but it put the empire at odds with the emerging international drug 
control movement. 
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At the beginning of the twentieth century a confluence of technological, medical, 
religious, and political processes piqued global interest in narcotics regulation and ushered in an 
era of drug diplomacy that swept the Ottoman Empire up into debates over international 
narcotics control. According to William B. McAllister, whose survey of twentieth century drug 
diplomacy details these trends, “currents in nineteenth-century science, research, technology, 
industry, business organization, and marketing converged in the realm of drugs.”108 Considering 
the cases of heroin and cocaine, for example, advances in global transportation infrastructure, a 
growing patent medicine sector, improved pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, the 
proliferation of medical journals, and the emergence of aggressive drug advertising campaigns 
throughout Europe and North America dramatically increased their popularity during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century.109 In response, domestic social reform groups and the 
emerging public health establishment led calls for increased drug regulation and enforcement, 
which produced formal narcotics laws and ethical rules for their pharmaceutical industries in 
most North American and European countries by 1914.110 Simultaneously, missionary societies, 
civil servants, businessmen, and politicians propelled drug control into the international arena of 
multilateral negotiations by highlighting global connections between cultivation, refinement, and 
consumption in their push for regulation.111 The tireless efforts of these early twentieth century 
internationalists, resulted in a series of multilateral forums that aimed to encourage major 
narcotics producers, like the Ottoman Empire, to introduce regulation regimes.   
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The Ottoman Empire, however, fiercely resisted international efforts to curb its opiate 
industry and refused to partake in multilateral narcotics negotiations.112 The Ottoman State, for 
example, declined to attend in the 1909 Shanghai Opium Commission on the grounds that 
domestic unrest following Abdülhamid II’s countercoup precluded their participation.113 
Similarly, Istanbul claimed that the 1911 Hague Opium Conference would negatively impact the 
state’s economy and—in the context of growing nationalist sentiment and the build up to the 
First World War—once again ignored international appeals to participate.114 Although the Allied 
occupation of the Ottoman Empire during World War I forced the terms of the 1911 Hague 
Convention on the remnants on the Ottoman state in Istanbul, the Turkish nationalists’ 1922 
victory over Greek forces in western Anatolia and the abolition of the sultanate in 1923, 
according to Gingeras, “rendered Ottoman acquiescence to the Hague consensus null and 
void.”115 
During the early years of the Turkish Republic, the country’s position on narcotics 
regulation differed little from its imperial predecessor. Rather than acquiesce to global narcotics 
controls, the modern Turkish Republic played a prominent role in the international opiate 
economy from its inception.116 Out of the devastation of World War I, the Turkish War of 
Independence, forced migration, and intense internal social conflict, Turkey emerged as one of 
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the world’s primary cultivators of raw opium during the 1920s.117 As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Turkey alone nearly supplied the demand from European opiate refiners during the late 
1920s.118 With intense international pressure on dominate European opiate refiners Switzerland, 
France, and Germany during the late 1920s and early 1930s, Turkish narcotics manufactures 
increased their production capacity and transformed Istanbul into the world’s foremost purveyor 
of opiates.119 
While Turkey began to attend multilateral drug control negotiations after 1924, 
McAllister argues that it did not do so out of a genuine desire to limit the production and 
consumption of narcotics. As he suggests, Turkey’s presence at the 1924-1925 International 
Opium Convention in Geneva—and that of other major drug cultivating nations like Bolivia, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Persia, Siam, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia—served merely to ensure 
the country’s ability to veto proposals it considered too burdensome.120 Rather than regulate 
Turkish production, the author confirms that the restrictions that the convention placed on 
western narcotics manufactures stimulated illicit opiate refinement in Turkey and transformed it 
into the “favored location for unscrupulous operators.”121 This development, in turn, shaped 
Turkish participation in the 1930 Preliminary Conference on the Limitation of the Manufacture 
of Narcotic Drugs in London, where the nation’s representatives, in McAllister’s words, 
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“delivered the final blow” to the failing negotiations by demanding one-third of the entire global 
quota for the export of manufactured drugs.122 
Although markedly less definitive than McAllister’s assessment, Turkish government 
documents from the period in between the 1930 and 1931 multilateral narcotics control 
conventions provide further details concerning the country’s policy towards drug regulation 
during the late 1920s and early 1930s. A report from Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü 
Aras to the Prime Minister’s Office, for example, at least in principle acknowledges the need for 
international narcotics control by stating that “[o]ur government’s goal in regards to opium is 
this: opium constitutes and an important segment of out agricultural economy, but it is not a 
foreign issue [to us] to save humanity from the calamity of opium addiction. On the condition 
that we protect and defend out agricultural sector, we are not opposed to international 
restrictions.”123 However, in the same report, Rüştü also asserts Turkey’s role as “important 
player in the opiate producing economy” as well as Turkey’s participation in an “appropriate 
quota” system among opiate refining countries.124 Similarly, a report that the Turkish Health and 
Social Assistance Ministry (Sihhat ve İctimai Muavenet Vekâleti or S.İ.M.) commissioned prior 
to the multilateral narcotics control conference in 1931 characterizes opium as “one of the 
country’s very important economic products” and, furthermore, notes that the “export of raw 
opium [from Turkey] is not subject to any regulation.”125   
 Although these reports do not constitute a comprehensive description of the late Ottoman 
and Turkish government’s position towards opium regulation, they do provide a clear sense of 
both the principals and limitations that that guided their approaches to narcotics control. During 
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the early nineteenth century opium cultivation began to play a prominent role in the Ottoman 
economy. Despite state attempts to regulate the industry, internal and external pressures 
contributed to the laissez-faire nature of the Anatolian opium economy well into the twentieth 
century. The late Ottoman state refused to introduce narcotics production controls out of a sense 
of preoccupation and economic nationalism, which did not abate with the emergence of 
Republican Turkey and its participation in international drug conferences. The Egyptian opiate 
epidemic of the late 1920s and early 1930s, however, precipitated a wave of international 
pressure that forced Turkey to reconfigure its approach to narcotics control and dramatically 
altered the country’s opiate economy. 
Egypt, Turkey, and International Narcotics Control during the Interwar Period  
 
 Beyond the local social, economic, and political impacts of the interwar Egyptian opiate 
epidemic on which the previous chapter focuses, narcotics trafficking and consumption in 
interwar Egypt also had great regional and international implications. In response to widespread 
opiate use throughout the country, the Egyptian press launched a popular media assault on their 
nation’s Turkish suppliers, which aimed both to inform the public of the ongoing epidemic and 
rally support for international narcotics regulation in Turkey. Simultaneously, Egyptian 
politicians and diplomats applied bilateral and multilateral pressure on their Turkish counterparts 
to introduce domestic narcotics regulation. Both Egyptian media and diplomatic efforts played a 
significant role in shaping the Turkish position towards drug control and the country’s increasing 
adherence to international narcotics regulations during the interwar era. Egyptian pressure 
constituted one crucial part of a larger international campaign that aimed to implement drug 
control regimes in Turkey and across the globe.  
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Despite earlier failures of international drug diplomacy at the Shanghai Opium 
Commission (1909) and the Hague Opium Conference (1911), during the late 1920s and early 
1930s multilateral efforts to control the global supply of narcotics continued. The League of 
Nations, which incorporated “the general supervision over the execution of agreements with 
regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs” 
into its covenant, served as the venue for global narcotics regulation efforts throughout the 
interwar era.126 During this period the League hosted regular meetings in Geneva of the Advisory 
Committee on the Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous Drug (OAC) as well as narcotics 
conventions and conferences in 1924-1925, 1931, and 1936.127  
Although Egypt did not gain membership to the League of Nations until 1937 and, 
therefore, could not participate as an official representative in the OAC, conventions, and 
conferences, it, nonetheless, played a huge role in the organization’s narcotics deliberations.128 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, presenting facts to the League of Nations constituted one 
of the CNIB’s four primary goals.129 Additionally, CNIB director Russell kept in “close touch” 
with the 1921-1934 British representative to the OAC Sir Malcolm Delevingne, circulated the 
bureau’s reports to the committee, and often addressed it as a representative of the Egyptian 
government.130 In conjunction with the work of the CNIB and Egyptian diplomats, the Egyptian 
media applied fierce popular pressure on the Turkish government with frequent articles 
excoriating the country for its position on narcotics control. These efforts greatly contributed to 
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the international campaign for drug regulations in Turkey and had a significant impact on 
Turkish narcotics control policy. 
Egypt’s first contribution to the international campaign for narcotics control in Turkey 
appeared in the country’s press. In addition to articles such as those in al-Muṣawwar and al-
Laṭā’if al-Muṣawwar raising public awareness about the opiate epidemic and the government 
response to it, reports from the Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Prime Minister’s Office in 
Ankara demonstrate that publications like al-Kashkul, al-Ahram, al-Mesā’, and al-Muqaṭam also 
directly addressed Turkey’s role in supplying raw and processed opiates. For example, in its 
article lampooning Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, al-Kashkul notes the following:  
“…in Turkey a vast of amount of opium is trafficked and the sale of narcotics substances 
constitutes an important portion of Turkey’s budget revenue. The [Turkish] treasury 
therefore earns seven million [Turkish] Lira a year [from this trade] and, as Egypt is one 
of the closest countries to Turkey, the merchants that sell the products of Istanbul opium 
factories use every kind of trick (her dürlü [sic.] hileleri istimal ettiklerinden). News of 
Turkey [engaging in] this type of behavior has even reached the League of Nations and 
the issue of the sale of these poisonous substances in Turkey constitutes the most 
important [issue of] deliberation for the League’s upcoming meeting.131 
 
With international news agencies like Reuters picking up and distributing such articles, al-
Kashkul and other Egyptian newspapers laid the blame for opiate addiction in Egypt squarely at 
the feet of Turkey’s top policymakers and cast aspersions on the nascent Republic that 
reverberated throughout the halls of power in Cairo and Ankara as well as Geneva.132 
While Egyptian newspapers attacked the Turkish government for its opportunistic opiate 
policies, Egypt’s diplomats and politicians brought the struggle against narcotics to Ankara and 
Geneva. As Turkish Foreign Minister Rüştü notes in his report to the Prime Minister’s Office in 
January of 1931, in the period leading up to the OAC’s meeting the following month, “Egyptian 
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consulates in Turkey showed intense interest in this issue [of narcotics control].”133 Owing to the 
CNIB’s earlier success using the OAC as a venue to build international support for narcotics 
regulation in Central Europe, the Egyptian government used this meeting as an opportunity to 
rally international support in opposition to the Turkish opiate industry.134 Drawing upon the 
bureau’s detailed reports and statistics concerning the past year’s drug trafficking activity, 
Director Russell demonstrated that Turkey had replaced Central Europe as the primary supplier 
of opiates consumed in Egypt and that Turkish factories exported approximately six times the 
legal global demand for opiates.135  
Russell’s address to the Committee on behalf of the CNIB did not constitute an 
immediate success. In the face of what Russell referred to as “the glaring search-light of public 
opinion,” Turkish officials appeared unmoved.136 Turkish representative Fuat Bey countered by 
questioning the CNIB’s statistics and the two delegates lapsed into what Russell describes as an 
“animated” discussion concerning the legitimacy of narcotics production in Turkey.137 Although 
Fuat Bey’s initial position echoes the economic nationalism and concern about Turkish 
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sovereignty from Foreign Minister Rüştü’s pledge to “protect and defend out agricultural sector,” 
it appears his defensive response quickly gave way to a form strategic accommodation.138  
Despite Turkish protestations, the country’s position on opiate control shifted 
significantly following the February 1931 Committee meeting in Geneva. That month, in fact, 
the Egyptian newspaper al-Muqaṭam reported that the Turkish government decided to shutter 
three narcotics factories in Istanbul.139 A governmental decree (kararname) from the Prime 
Minister’s Office notes that Mustafa Kemal gave permission to shut one of these, the Etkim 
factory in Istanbul’s Eyüp neighborhood, after it “tried to deceive the government” and had 
“been proven to be engaging in narcotics trafficking.”140 Turkey’s move to close narcotics 
factories in Istanbul, as the Alexandria based La Réforme noted, also coincided with new export 
regulations and the appointment of “special agents” to monitor production that reported to the 
S.İ.M.141 While it remains unclear to what extent Egyptian and multilateral diplomatic pressure 
elicited these responses, the Egyptian press did not hesitate to construct a causal relationship 
between the two. According to al-Muqaṭam, this decision “without a doubt takes world public 
opinion into account after the recently discovered facts about narcotics substance trafficking in 
Egypt and Cairo Police Chief Russell Pasha’s statement at the Geneva Opium Commission.”142 
Building off the sense of optimism that initial shifts in Turkey’s narcotics policy generated, al-
Muqaṭam went as far as to project the end of the country’s opiate industry by stating that “we 
await the banning of this trade.”143 
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Although Turkish government documents offer no indication of motives behind their 
decisions to begin implementing narcotics controls, they do present Turkish officials as eager to 
exploit policy shifts to improve their country’s public image in Cairo and Geneva. In a May 27, 
1931 report from the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s Political Consultancy (Türkiye Cumhuriyet 
Hariciye Vekâlati Siyasî Müşavirlik) to the Prime Minister’s Office, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Şükrü Kaya conveys the following: 
As soon as the aforementioned [Turkish] newspaper [about a new law in Turkey 
regulating the sale and export of narcotics] arrived at the embassy [in Cairo] I had the 
committee representative’s decision translated [into Arabic and] I requested a meeting 
with the [Egyptian] Foreign Minister in order to give him a translated copy. Being happy 
with the declaration, Abdel Fattah Yahiya Pasha said that because of the decision to 
subject cocaine and heroin—the most devastating drugs to the people of Egypt—to strict 
controls, Turkey had achieved great and beneficial results[.] I sent the second copy of this 
decision to Cairo Police Chief Russell Pasha. He was also pleased with the decision and 
said that he was confident of the great benefits of the Turkish Republic’s good will 
towards humanity…On the issue at hand, the Egyptian press is content to print this 
[decision] verbatim and neither advances an idea for us or against us on this matter. Up 
until the publishing of this decision, because of trafficking, the Egyptian press 
publications were intensely against us, of course, [but] suddenly they are changing their 
tone (bir den bire [sic.] tebdili lisan ederek) and printing all the details.144 
 
Kaya’s concern that both Egyptian diplomats and the local press acknowledge the Turkish 
government’s initial narcotics control measures demonstrates the impact that these individuals 
and their associated institutions had in shaping Turkey’s emerging drug policy. While many of 
the shifts they effected likely constituted incremental or even superficial changes in Turkish 
policy, these groups contributed to a much larger movement that coalesced that spring in 
Geneva. 
 The 1931 “Conference on the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs” 
demonstrates the confluence of Egyptian and international efforts to pressure Turkey into 
enacting narcotics controls. During the meeting (May 27–July 13, 1931), the United States, 
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Canada, Egypt, other narcotics consuming countries continued to advocate for limited controls 
on raw opium, heroin, morphine, and increasingly popular opium-based derivatives such as 
codeine.145 On the other hand, drug-producing states like Turkey and Yugoslavia aimed to 
leverage their capacity to flood the market with opiates to gain favorable regulatory 
conditions.146 “The Turks,” according to McAllister, “used their manufacturing capacity as a 
bargaining chip; they would close domestic factories if western pharmaceutical firms promised 
to buy their raw opium from Ankara.”147 The disparity in the positions of these two camps 
resulted in a combination of lively multilateral debate and bilateral coercion targeting Turkey’s 
narcotics industry. 
 Attending the conference as a representative of Egypt, CNIB director Russell participated 
vigorously in the debate. In a report concerning the conference from the Turkish Foreign 
Ministry’s Political Consultancy to the Prime Minister’s Office, Foreign Minister Rüştü objects 
to the impact of the address that Russell gave to conference in noting that: 
At the Geneva conference many different countries’ statements were opposed to Turkey 
and, in particular, the remarks that Egypt’s General Security Chief Russell Pasha [made] 
on this spot have been published in detail in the newspapers. [This] has produced the idea 
that Turkey does not want to deal with the trafficking of narcotic substances and does not 
regard the humane aspects of this issue as important.148 
 
Furthermore, Rüşü complains that the continued appearance of articles about Turkish opiate 
trafficking in European periodicals “creates the opinion that Turkey tolerates opium 
smuggling.”149 In linking Russell’s address to the conference to newspaper articles about drug 
trafficking in Turkey, the Foreign Minister’s comments illuminate the connections between 
international media and diplomatic pressure in the campaign for drug control in Turkey. 
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 While Egypt employed the conference as a venue to place multilateral pressure on 
Turkey, the United States simultaneously took a much more direct approach. Harry Anslinger 
attended the conference on behalf of the United States Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), 
which the country’s established in 1930 to address domestic and international narcotics 
trafficking and served as the predecessor to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). 150 Anslinger, 
who served as FBN commissioner from 1930–1962, openly called on Turkey to end, what the 
bureau viewed as, the overproduction and illicit trafficking of narcotics.151 Perhaps 
understanding how economic nationalism factored into Turkish narcotics policy, Anslinger, 
furthermore, threated to prohibit drug imports from Turkey unless the country acceded to the 
bureau’s demands.152 While it does not appear that Anslinger acted on this threat and Turkey left 
the conference having refused to sign the 1931 narcotics treaty, the conference set the stage for 
more successful Egyptian and United States attempts at diplomacy and coercion in the near 
future.153  
 Although the 1931 conference did not succeed in convincing the Turkish government to 
regulate its opiate industry, it caught the attention of Turkish policymakers and paved the way 
for both the United States and Egypt to engage in high-level bilateral drug discussions with 
Turkey. In fall of 1931, for example, the Egyptian government granted permission for Russell to 
travel to Istanbul and Ankara, where he discussed narcotics control with Prime Minister İsmet 
İnönü.154 Unlike the tense and initially unproductive interactions between Russell and the 
Turkish delegate to the OAC, the CNIB director notes in his memoir that “…Ismet Pasha 
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received me in the most friendly and hospitable manner.”155 As Russell met with Prime Minister 
İnönü, the US State Department dispatched the American Ambassador to Turkey Joseph Grews 
to make the case for narcotics control to President Atatürk.156 According to Russell their 
collective diplomacy played a significant role in shaping Turkish narcotics control policy and he 
notes the following in describing his meeting with İnönü: 
From that date the fate of Istanbul as a centre of the illicit drug traffic was sealed. It lay 
with the American Minister to Turkey [Ambassador Grew] to bring the state of affairs to 
the direct notice of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who at once realized that not only was Istanbul 
becoming a menace to the health of the world but also that local addiction was spreading 
among the officer class of his own army.157  
 
While Russell’s comments provide a social and humanitarian logic for understanding coming 
shifts in Turkey’s narcotics control policy, Turkish government reports demonstrate that 
economic concerns clearly also factored into the decisions of İnönü, Atatürk, and other 
prominent politicians.  
 As Russell and Grew worked to influence Turkish narcotics policy with direct social and 
humanitarian appeals in Ankara, FBN Commissioner Anslinger labored in Washington to create 
stronger economic disincentives for Turkish opiate trafficking. In this effort, he enlisted the help 
of New York Congressman Fiorello La Guardia to draft a bill in the House of Representatives 
that would subject all shipments from states not party to 1912 Hague Convention to searches for 
illicit drugs.158 Similar to Anslinger’s previous threat to ban drug imports from Turkey, it does 
not appear that La Guardia introduced this legislation, but rather that the bill remained in 
committee from 1931–1932.159 In this way, it seems, La Guardia and Anslinger maintained the 
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specter of legislation that would negatively impact all Turkish exports to the United States 
without hindering the delicate diplomatic work of their colleagues Russell and Grew. 
Irrespective of the logic behind Anslinger’s machinations, La Guardia’s prospective 
legislation produced tangible results. One indication of its impact comes in the form of a report 
from Turkish Foreign Minister Kaya to the Prime Minister’s Office in February 1932 detailing 
La Guardia’s proposed legislation in the context of House of Representatives discussions 
concerning narcotics trafficking from Istanbul to the United States. 160 This report shows the 
Turkish state’s keen interest in the legislation and suggests that the government gave credence 
Anslinger’s threat.161 Most significantly, a decree from the Prime Minister’s Office in April 1932 
labeled “confidential” characterizes La Guardia’s prospective legislation as “potentially having 
extraordinarily harmful impacts on our country’s economy.”162 This decree, which bears the 
signatures of Atatürk and his full cabinet, approves a resolution to join the 1925 Geneva 
International Opium Convention so as to address the concerns behind the La Guardia’s 
legislation and “put a stop to the waves of false imputations against our country.”163  
 The Turkish government made the unprecedented announcement that it would comply 
with the 1925 Geneva Convention on December 25, 1925. A decree from the Prime Minister’s 
Office on that day frames this monumental decision by stating that President Atatürk “carefully 
examined the health, economic, and agricultural issues” related to narcotics so as to create a 
“permanent plan” for the benefit of “all humanity, and the high interests of the [Turkish] 
nation.”164 Beyond these vague platitudes, however, the decree offers little explanation of the 
economic, diplomatic, and media forces that propelled this dramatic change. This statement, of 
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course, makes no mention of the Egyptian opiate epidemic that fueled a popular media campaign 
targeting the public image of the nascent Turkish Republic in region and around the world. Nor 
does it address how this campaign connected with a broader international diplomatic effort to 
implement narcotics controls in Turkey. Finally, it gives littler sense that Turkey’s acceptance of 
the terms of the 1925 Geneva Convention marked the culmination of systematic multilateral 
effort that heralded significant shifts in the country’s approach to drug control. 
Despite these omissions, the document does provide a somewhat clear sense of the form 
that Turkey’s emerging narcotics control regime would assume. In addition to accepting the 
terms of the 1925 Geneva Convention, the decree states that Turkey will pursue illicit trafficking, 
ban hashish, and create special courts to adjudicate cases involving clandestine producers and 
smugglers.165 However, the most significant change to Turkey’s narcotics industry came by way 
of a plan to “supply products designed for to medical and scientific needs through a state 
monopoly.”166 During the mid 1930s this monopoly would transform the Turkish opiate economy 
and have a surprising impact on the state’s relationship to opium.  
The Narcotic Substance Monopoly and the Transformation of the Turkish Opiate Industry 
While the Turkish Republic’s Narcotic Substance Monopoly (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Uyuşturucu Maddeler İnhisarı or U.M.İ.) emerged out of an effort to control the drug trade in 
Turkey, moving to monopolize the production of narcotics had significant consequences for the 
country’s economy and institutions. The U.M.İ. intervened in Turkey’s lucrative informal opiate 
industry and, as intended, displaced many of the narcotics manufacturers and traffickers who 
operated illicitly within the country. However, government control simultaneously placed opium 
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cultivation, refinement, and distribution in the hands Turkish bureaucrats and politicians. The 
profitability of the trade transformed opiates from illicit substances into commodities that 
constituted a significant source of revenue during a period of intense financial strain. Although 
international diplomatic, economic, and popular pressure led the Turkish government to create 
the U.M.İ., the monopoly also represented and funded Turkey’s pivot towards etatism 
(devletçilik in Turkish) and a corresponding increase in investment for state-run industries in 
response to the poor economic conditions that the country faced during the interwar period.  
Severe economic hardship marked the 1920s and 1930s in Turkey. As the country 
struggled to address the lingering economic impact the First World War and the Turkish War of 
Independence, the Great Depression led to unfavorable global market conditions that triggered 
an acute decline in the price of Turkish agricultural commodities and a foreign exchange crisis in 
Turkey.167 In response to subsequent increases in popular discontent, the Turkish government 
embarked on a path of etatism in 1932.168 Turkey’s statist economic policies envisioned the 
government as the primary producer and investor in national industries and, by 1940, the state 
played a significant role in the production of iron and steel, textiles, sugar, glass, cement, 
utilities, mining, as well as opiates.169 Although economic historian Şevket Pamuk qualifies the 
initial aims and eventual contributions of the program as “modest,” state expenditures rose 
gradually during the period in which the Turkey implemented statist policies.170 Created in the 
early 1930s as a means of helping the Turkish state address international concerns about the 
opiate trade, the U.M.İ. both exemplifies the country’s shift towards etatism and likely funded 
these policies.  
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In the years following Turkey’s 1932 announcement that it would regulate the opiate 
trade “through a state monopoly,” the U.M.İ. gradually took shape. On June 6, 1933, the Prime 
Minister’s Office appointed former Sanayi Kredi Bankası (Industrial Credit Bank) assistant 
manager Ali Sami Bey to direct the “newly formed” U.M.İ.171 After Sami’s appointment, 
government documents show that the U.M.İ. acquired a total of 900,000 TL in loans from the 
Ministry of Finance as well as various state-owned banks including Sümerbank and Ziraat 
Bankası (Agriculture Bank).172 These banks played keys roles in facilitating statist policies to 
develop Turkey’s textile and mechanized agriculture industries as well as implementing state 
economic plans.173 With their financial support, state documents show that the U.M.İ. quickly 
took to the task of studying opiate monopolies and markets by sending officials to Iran, where 
Reza Shah established government control over the opium trade in 1925, and Japan, which 
emerged as a major distributer of Turkish opiates as early as 1935.174 Government reports from 
October 1934 also demonstrate that the U.M.İ. purchased 2.2 kg. of opium poppy seeds from 
Iran “in order to improve opium agriculture” and that it gained the approval of the state to 
cultivate opium in seventeen provinces throughout the country.175 During the early 1930s the 
U.M.İ. also developed a branding strategy that included a “registered trademark” (markanın 
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tescili) for the monopoly.176 This “trademark” combined the Turkish acronym ‘U.M.İ.’ with the 
national symbols of the crescent moon and star to create a sleek, modern, and professional logo 
that encapsulated the international political significance of the government narcotics monopoly. 
Although the U.M.İ. in no way eliminated narcotics refinement and trafficking in Turkey, it 
replaced the images of the illicit trade in Turkish opiates with a convincing veneer of 
government control and efficiency. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to its political significance, the U.M.İ. quickly emerged as an important 
segment of the Turkish economy. As government reports from 1934–1937 demonstrate, opiates 
constituted a major source of revenue for the Turkish state even during periods when adverse 
weather negatively impacted opium cultivation. U.M.İ. financial statements from 1934–1935, for 
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example, note that the year’s “crop was affected by the cold in some areas.”177 Despite weather-
related damage, the documents show that in this period the U.M.İ. purchased approximately 
47,639 kilograms of raw opium and sold approximately 39,745 kilograms of opium and 
processed narcotics for a total of 683,691.88 Turkish Lira (TL).178 Furthermore, the U.M.İ. 
maintained a stock of 160,800 kilograms of raw and processed opium that it valued at TL 
1,395,541 and total assets (including stocks of narcotics, loans to customers, and physical assets) 
at TL 3,477,606.76.179 Together, the U.M.İ.’s reported assets in 1935 represented nearly four 
times the value of the state’s initial TL 900,000 investment in the monopoly in 1934 and suggest 
the highly lucrative nature of this state-controlled enterprise. 
While it remains difficult to assess the importance this industry simply in monetary 
terms, a 1937 report from Turkish Minister of Finance Fuat Ağrılı to the Prime Minister’s Office 
provides further indication of the opiate trade’s significance to the state. In the report Ağrılı 
argues that the state should build an additional opiate factory in Ankara to address increased 
manufacturing capacity in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on the grounds that the opiate industry 
constitutes an “importance source of foreign currency” for Turkey.180 Attached to the minister’s 
proposal, a report from the Istanbul branch of the British trading firm J.W. Whittall and Co. 
LTD. follows Ağırlı’s line of logic in arguing that “with time opium [pharmaceutical products] 
will constitute approximately ten percent of our exports.”181 Although both Ağırlı as well as J.W. 
Whittall and Co. likely overestimated the relative importance of opiates to the Turkish economy 
for the sake of making their argument, their statements, nonetheless, underscore the significant 
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impact of the trade and, thus, the role of the U.M.İ. in helping the Turkish government balance 
foreign trade. 
U.M.İ. financial statements also suggest that the Turkish government used the lucrative 
monopoly to balance the state budget. Under a section of the U.M.İ’s February 1935 financial 
report titled “Administrative Tasks,” for example, it states that “as our capital this year was not 
placed in our budget…in order for the new crop [of raw opium] to be purchased, we are in 
financial need.”182 Echoing the previous month’s statement, a section of the U.M.İ.’s March 
1935 financial report labeled “Needs” complains that “[o]ur capital was once again not received 
[by us] and, as [the interest] on our loans is gradually being capitalized, for the new crop [of raw 
opium] to be purchased, we are in need of financial support.”183 While neither document gives 
any indication how or for what purpose the Turkish government used the U.M.İ. capital, they do 
demonstrate that the profits from the opiate trade constituted an important source of revenue for 
the state during this period of intense economic strain and increased expenditures on statist 
economic policies. 
Throughout the 1930s the Turkish government’s relationship to the opiate trade changed 
significantly. Originally conceived of as a strategy to address the international campaign for 
Turkish narcotics control, the creation of the U.M.İ. transformed Turkey’s opiate trade from an 
informal nuisance into a formal institution. Similar to other state-owned industries in 1930s 
Turkey, the U.M.İ. came into existence during a period of dire economic hardship and increased 
statist policies, which shaped the trajectory and structure of the institution. Within the framework 
of the U.M.İ, opiates themselves changed from illicit substances into commodities that 
constituted an important part of state revenues. In this way, the U.M.İ. demonstrates the complex 
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history of the seemingly straightforward relationship between opiates and institutional 
development in interwar Turkey. 
Chapter Conclusion 
 The relationship between narcotics and the Turkish state changed dramatically during the 
late 1920s and early 1930s. In response to the opiate epidemic in Egypt, the Egyptian 
government joined an international diplomatic, economic, and popular media campaign to 
implement narcotics controls in Turkey. This campaign effected significant policy shifts that 
transformed Turkey’s opiate industry. Responding to international pressure, Turkey introduced 
regulations and created an official government monopoly to control the opiate trade in the model 
of other emerging Turkish state industries. The U.M.İ., contrary to the country’s previous 
concerns about the impact of the narcotics control on its national economy, emerged as an 
important source of revenue for the Turkish state during the interwar period.  
 In demonstrating the far-reaching and somewhat counterintuitive impacts of the interwar 
opiate trade and the Egyptian epidemic on Turkey, this chapter highlights the complex 
relationship between narcotics and state development in the country. Contrary to Egypt, Turkey 
directly benefited from the opiate trade between the two countries. However, the U.M.İ., the 
instrument that the Turkish state used to control the country’s opiate industry and its profits, 
emerged as a response to the same processes of sale and suppression that contributed to the 
development of drug enforcement and public health infrastructure in interwar Egypt. These 
processes demonstrate a dynamic in which both commercial and regulatory forces shape 
institutional development and, therefore, they incorporate traffickers along with politicians, 
diplomats, and bureaucrats into the narrative state building in early Republican Turkey. 
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Conclusion 
 Throughout the interwar era, tons of heroin, morphine, codeine, and numerous other 
opium-based derivatives, flowed across the Eastern Mediterranean from Turkey to Egypt. On 
their way from the poppy fields of Afyonkarahisar to the apartments and shanties of Cairo, these 
drugs passed through diverse hands. Farmers, merchants, chemists, traffickers, dealers, 
consumers, police, bureaucrats, politicians, diplomats, and, as al-Kashkul’s irreverent caricature 
implies, even presidents participated directly or indirectly in the regional opiate economy during 
the interwar period. Due to the trade’s wide reach and lucrative nature, opiates also had profound 
social, political, economic, and institutional impacts on the Eastern Mediterranean region as a 
whole and the countries of Turkey and Egypt in particular.  
In Egypt the interwar opiate trade created a variety of social problems as well as 
economic and political opportunities. Although generally absent from accounts of the trade, 
opiate trafficking allowed Egyptians to establish profitable networks that helped them relieve the 
devastating impact of 1929 economic crisis. In addition to illicit economic activity, the 
government response to the ensuing opiate epidemic provided opportunities for Egyptian 
bureaucrats and politicians to overcome the semi-colonial Egyptian state’s policies of fiscal 
austerity, construct enforcement institutions like the CNIB, and deliver public health services 
that addressed drug use and addiction. While these trafficking networks and government 
institutions had conflicting agendas, they developed in conjunction and together shaped the 
process of state-building in early twentieth century Egypt. 
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The interwar opiate trade and the Egyptian epidemic also had an immense impact on the 
politics, economy, and institutions of early Republican Turkey. While histories of interwar drug 
diplomacy tend to privilege American and European actors, Egypt greatly contributed to the 
international efforts that led to the implementation of Turkey’s 1930s drug regulations regime. 
This process turned Turkey’s opiate industry into an official government monopoly and 
transformed the state’s relationship to narcotics. As a result of these changes, opiates grew into a 
major source of state funds during a period when global market forces and emerging statist 
policies simultaneously created revenue shortages and increased expenditures respectively. 
In bringing together the histories interwar Egypt and Turkey, this research explores the 
relationship between commodity markets and state building in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Incorporating the perspectives of Turkish and Egyptian traffickers, dealers, consumers, 
bureaucrats, diplomats, and politicians into the history of the interwar opiate trade and the 
subsequent epidemic in Egypt, these histories supplement the current paradigm of commodity-
funded state-building with nuanced and indirect models of institutional development. The history 
of the opiate trade and epidemic in Egypt, for example, exposes a dynamic in which 
commodities themselves did not fund state-building. Instead, debates over the sale and 
suppression of opiates shaped negotiations between factions within the semi-colonial state 
regarding the future of institutional development in the country. Contrary to Egypt, Turkey 
directly profited from the sale of opiates. However, the institution through which the Turkish 
state controlled this trade grew out of the same currents of commerce and regulation that 
contributed to the development of narcotics enforcement and public health infrastructure in 
interwar Egypt. In examining the complex relationship between the sale and suppression of 
opiates and institutional development in Egypt and Turkey, this research weaves together the 
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lives of politicians, diplomats, bureaucrats, traffickers, dealers, and addicts, demonstrating their 
individual and collective impact in shaping the trajectory of state-building in the interwar Eastern 
Mediterranean from the bottom up. 
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